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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has lately decided, in
Lynch v. N. Y, L. E. & W. R. R., 30 At. Rep. 187, that a
Actions
suit is not commenced by the signing and sealing
of a summons, which has been retained in the
,office of the attorney, without any purpose of immediate
service.
According to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York, as expressed in In re Howard, 63 Fed. Rep. 263,
an " undercoachman," whose duties are partly to
Aliens
assist in keeping stables, horses and carriages in
good order, but principally to drive the horses when his employer, or any of his family, go out in carriages, and to
accompany on horseback the younger members of the family
.when they go out on horseback; and who
boards with his
employer's coachman, and sleeps in a room over the coach54
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house, is a "personal or domestic servant" within the meaning of the U. S. Statute of 1885, c. 164, prohibiting the
immigration of aliens under contracts for labor, and providing
that the provisions of the act shall not apply to "persons
employed strictly as personal or domestic servants." Since,
however, the Statute of 1'888, c. 121o, makes the decision of
the Secretary of the Treasury on such subjects conclusive,
the court declined to discharge the relator on habeas corpus.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently ruled,
that when an insolvent debtor executes, as part of the same
Assignment
forBenefitof
Creditors

transaction, several interdependent deeds of trust,
passing title to all his property subject to execution, for the benefit of certain creditors, with a

provision that the surplus, if any, is to be distributed among
his other creditors, holding legal claims, the deeds constitute
a general assignment: City Natl. Bk. v. lMerch. Natl. Bk., 27
S. W. Rep. 848.
In the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, when money is deposited with the cashier of a
bank, under an agreement that it shall be inBanks
and Banking vested by the bank in bonds and stocks, the bank
is liable for the return of the money, no investment having
been made, though the agreement for investment by the bank
was ultra vires; and the fact that the cashier embezzled the
money will not affect the bank's liability: L'Herbette v. Pittsfield Natl. Bk., 38 N. E. Rep. 368.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has rendered a decision
which will be welcome to all devotees of bicycling, for the
manner in which it asserts their rights upon public
highways. The substance of that dedision is, that
Bicyles
where a bicycler is riding along a highway, and a horse takes
fright at him, he will not be liable in damages to any one
injured thereby, unless he was acting in disregard of the
rights of others. The highway is intended for public use;
and a person driving a horse thereon has no rights superior to
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those of a person riding a bicycle. A bicycle is a vehicle,
and riding one in the usual manner, as is now done upon
public highways, for' convenience, recreation, pleasure or
business, is not unlawful ; "they cannot be banished, because
they were not ancient vehicles, and used in the Garden of
Eden by Adam and Eve :" Thompson v. Dodge, 6o N. W.
Rep. 545.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, an
act, which directs municipal officers to award certain contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder," vests
Bids
discretionary, and not merely ministerial powers
in such officers, the word "responsible." as therein used, ap
plying not only to pecuniary ability, but also to judgment
and skill: Interstate Vitrified Brick and Paving Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 30 Atl. Rep. 383 ; following Comm. v. Mitchell,
82 Pa. 343; Findley v. Pittsburgh, 82 Pa. 351; Douglas v.
Comm., ioS Pa. 559; Pavement Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. 623;
S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 16o.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Merchants' Natl..
Bk. v. McKinney, 6o N. W. Rep. 162, has ruled, that a stenographer's or referee's notes of evidence cannot, by
Bill of
Exceptions
stipulation of the parties, take the place of the
bill of exceptions, or of the statement of the case settled by
the judge, which must be returned to the Supreme Court by"
the clerk of the court below, as part of the judgment roll.
In the recent case of Charles Tyrrell Loan & Bldg. Assn. v,
Haley, 30 Atl. Rep. 154, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held, that.a member of a building and loan assoBuilding
Associations ciation, whose shares have not matured according
to the mode of computation originally adopted by the association, and used by it for nearly thirty years, is not estopped from
claiming that by another and more just method of computation his shares are matured. FELL and MITCHELL, JJ., dissented, however, and it would seem with good reason. In
the first place, the association, in the absence of any statutory
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restrictions, certainly has a right to adopt any method, not
manifestly unjust, of computing the value of its shares, which
it pleases; and in the second place, the member, having taken
his shares with full knowledge of the fact that such method
*of computation was the rule of the association, and not having objected to it previously, as applied to the shares of others,
'ought not to be heard now to raise that objection.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has lately ruled, in Zagelmeyer v. Cindn., S. & H. Ry. Co., 6o N. W. Rep. 436, that a
railroad company cannot impose, as a penalty for
Carriers,
Fares
not purchasing a ticket, such a sum that the fare
collected on the train, including that additional amount, shall
-exceed the maximum rate of fare allowed by law.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has just rendered a
,curious decision, in Pac. Exp. Co. v. Black, 27 S. W. Rep.
830, that a husband may recover from an express
.NegligenCe
company, which has failed to promptly deliver
medicines shipped to his wife, damages for both the physical
and mental suffering of the wife, but not, for sympathetic
mental suffering by him on account of the wife's pain. The
latter is too remote.
The ruling of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in
H/Tite v. Norfolk & S. R. R., 20 S, E. Rep. 191, is of great
importance to travellers, though fortunately the
Torts of
Servants
state of facts -which gave rise to it is not of
frequent occurrence. The court held that a carrier is liable
to a passenger for damages, if one of the crew goes outside
of his line of duty and assaults him; and that this doctrine
rests upon the obligation of the carrier, not only to carry his
passengers safely, but to protect them from ill treatment by
other passengers, intruders; or employ6s. This is.the general
ruleI East Tenn., V & G. Ry. Co. v. Fleetwood, (Ga.), 15 S. E.
Rep. 778; Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Cooper, (Ind.), 33
N. E. Rep. 2i9; Ciizens' St. Ry. Co. of Indianapolis v.
" Willoeby, (Ind.), 33 N. E. Rep. 627; Harrold v. Winona &
St. Peter R. R., 47 Minn. 17; S. C., 49 N. W. Rep. 389;
,Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. fclronigal,(Tex.), 25 S. W.
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Rep. 341 ; but the carrier is not liable if the servant was exposed to provocation sufficient to justify the assault, or acted
in self defence, under a reasonable apprehension of immediate
danger : New Orleans & Northeastern R. R. Co. v. Jones, 142
U. S. i8; S. C., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. Io9.
The English Chancery Division has lately decided, in Alt
v. Lord Stratheden, [18941] 3 Ch. 265, that a gift by will for
the benefit of a volunteer corps is a charitable
Charitable
Bequests
bequest; and that a bequest of an annuity to be
piovided to a volunteer corps on the appointment of the next
lieutenant-colonel, is void as a transgression of the rule against
perpetuities, since such an officer may never be appointed.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of
Wick China Co. v. Brown, 30 Atl. Rep. 26 !, ruled, that a preConspiracy, liminary injunction, rightfully granted against
Injunction
members of a labor union, alleged to have combined and conspired to prevent the plaintiff from employing
other workmen in its factory, should not have been dissolved,
when the answer, signed by twenty-one of the defendants, is
not sworn to, though affidavits, made by nearly all the defendants, deny certain acts of violence charged in the bill. The
order dissolving the preliminary injunction was reversed and
.set aside, and the injunction reinstated and continued.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently passed upon
a new question of law, in Pope v. Benster, 6o N. W. Rep. 561,
holding that there was no reason Why real estate
Conversion,
Real Estate should not be made the subject of a suit in the
nature of conversion, by analogy to personal property; and
that therefore (I) When the owner of a judgment, which to
his knowledge has been paid, but never satisfied of record, and
which remains an apparent lien on real estate of ahother,
causes execution to be issued on that judgment, the real estate
on which it is an apparent lien to be levied on and sold, such
sale to be confirmed, and a conveyance therefor to be executed
and delivered to the purchaser at the execution sale, and
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accepts the proceeds of that sale, the owner of the real estate
so sold may treat the sale as void and recover the land; or,
at his election, he may waive the invalidity of the sale, and sue
the owner of the judgment for the value of the real estate;
,(2) The measure of damages in such a case is the fair market
valu-e of the interest of the owner in the real estate at the time
.of its sale on execution; (3)In such an action, the owner of
.the judgment is estopped from asserting, as a defence, that the
.execution sale, and the subsequent proceedings, were void.
According to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, a Board of
Health may be authorized by statute to make rules for the
Constitutional disinfection of the baggage of persons coming
Law,
from a country where contagious disease exists,
Board of
Health

and making it a misdemeanor for any person to
refuse to permit his baggage to be disinfected, and such rules are
therefore not unconstitutional; but such a statute does not
authorize a rule to subject the baggage of all immigrants to
disinfection, irrespective of the locality from which they come:
Hurst v. Warner, 6o N. W. Rep. 44o.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that a contract for
the removal of dead animals, garbage and other noxious and
unwholesome matter, from cities, though conferExclusive
Privilege
ring exclusive privileges upon the contractor, is
not unconstitutional, as contravening a provision of the constitution that "the legislature shall not pass any special or
local laws . . . . granting to any corporation, association or
individual, any special or exclusive privileges, immunity or
franchise whatever:" Smiley v. MacDonald,6o N. W. Rep. 355.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York, when
the president of a corporation ratifies for the benefit of the
acting
Corporation, corporation a contract made by him while
Contracts of as a promoter thereof, for services to be rendered
Promoters
to the corporation, and such services are performed
for the corporation, and the contract providing therefor is one
which would have bound the corporation, if made by the presi-
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dent after it had acquired a legal existence, the corporation
is bound by the contract: Oakes v. Cataraugus Water Co.,
38 N. E. Rep. 461.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado has recently decided,
that when, by statute or charter, the power of electing the
Election of president of a corporation is vested in the board
Officers
of directors, an election of a president by the
stockholders at their annual meeting is a nullity, and confers
no title to the office: Walsenburg Water Co. v. Moore, 38 Pac.
Rep. 6o.
. The English Chancery Division has recently passed upon a
very interesting point of parliamentary practice, in Nat. Dwellings Soc. v. Sykes, [1894] 3 Ch. 159, in which
Meetings,
Adjournment case it was held, that it is the duty of a chairman
to preserve order, conduct proceedings regularly, and take care
that the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with
regard to any question before it; but that he has no power to
stop or adjourn a meeting at his own will; and if he attempts
to do so, it is competent for the meeting to resolve to go on
with the business for which it has been convened, and to
appoint another chairman for that purpose.
The same court has ruled, that the withdrawal of an application for shares in a corporation may be made orally at any
time before notice of allotment is given; and that,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
court will presume that a clerk in the registered office of a
corporation, is, during business hours, and while the secretary
is absent, so far in charge of the office, that he has authority
to receive a notice, so as to make it a commdnication to the
corporation: In re Brewery Assets Corporation, [ 1894] 3 Ch.
Subscription,
Withdrawal

272.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Iowa, the fact that,
pending a suit to subject land to the payment of a judgment,
the judgment is satisfied of record, does not
Courts,
Jurisdiction deprive the court of further jurisdiction, so as to
render a decree of sale void: Oliver v. Riley, 6o N. W. Rep.
i8o.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

The last mentioned court has also lately decided, that when
a contract of shipment by rail does not define what shall
Custom

constitute a carload, a general

custom among

railroad men and shippers, by which a carload is
made to consist of a certain number of pounds, governs the
contract: Good v. Chic., R. . & P. Ry. Co., 6o N. W. Rep.
and Usage

63 1.

The Supreme Court of Indiana holds that a deed of land,
given by one not judicially declared insane, cannot, during his
Deeds
lifetime, be avoided on the ground of insanity, by
one to whom, under the provisions of a will, the
land would descend, if not disposed of by the grantor in the
deed during his lifetime: McMillan v. Deering, 38 N. E. Rep398.
The Chancery Division has recently reasserted the doctrine,
that if it can be gathered from the words used by the testator,
that- he intended to give a particular property to
Devise
a legatee, but owing to the testator having
several properties answering the description in the will, it is
impossible to say, either from the will itself, or from extrinsic
evidence, which of these several properties the testator referred
to, the gift fails for uncertainty, and the court cannot, to
avoid intestacy, construe the will as giving the legatee the
option of electing which property he will take: Asten v. Asten,
[1894] 3 Ch. 260.
According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, money paid
by a mortgagee, in excess of the amount due on
Duress
the mortgage, to stop foreclosure 'proceedings, is
a voluntary payment, and cannot be recovered on the ground
of duress: Vereycken v. Vandenhook, 6o N. W. Rep. 687.'
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has lately
held, in Shaughnessy v. Leary, 38 N. E. Rep. 197, that when a

person .has adversely used a wooden drain across
another's land, the laying of an earthen pipe
inside the wooden drain does not interrupt the running of the
Easements
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statute of limitations in favor of the easement therein, for a.
greater or more burdensome use of the drain does not make
it a different drain, or destroy the character of such use as is
continuous; and, as a matter of law, the fact that the earthen
pipe was laid at the joint expense of the owners of the servient and the dominant tenements does not prevent the use of
it by the latter from being adverse. Nor, according to the
same'court, does an enlargement of.a drain at the joint expense of the owners of the servient and dominant tenements,
destroy the identity of the drain so as to destroy the easement: Jones v. Adams, 38 N. E. Rep. 437.
The Supreme .Court of Michigan very properly holds, that
voters may rely upon the regularity of the ballots prepared bythe proper officers; and that it does not matter
Elections,
Ballots
that a person whose name is printed on the ballot
was not the nominee of any party, and that his name was not
properly certified, and not entitled to a place on the ballot; if'
elected, he is entitled to the office: Bragdon v. Navarre, 6o
N. W. Rep. 277. This, of course, supposes that no fraud was.
intended or practiced by the officers who prepared the ballots ;
if such was the case, the above decision would hardly apply.
The Supreme Court of New York is of opinion, that a.
statute, providing that the inhabitants of a town
Polling
Places
may have their polling place in a city created
within the limits of the town, is constitutional: Peo v. Carson,.
30 N. Y. Suppl., 817.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota ha just rendered an
important decision under the Australian Ballot Law, in State v.
Voters,

Braley, 6o N. W. Rep. 676, to the effect that the

requirement of the statute that an oath must be
administered to an alleged illiterate or physically disabled
voter before he can have the aid of another person in marking
his ballot, is mandatory; and the voter who requests such aid
must, under oath, bring himself strictly within the terms of'
the statute as to his inability to mark his own ballot. He
cannot avail himself of aid on the ground that he usually uses
glasses, but has not brought them with him. The same was
Disability
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held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, a few months earlier,
in Ellis v. Reynolds, 58 N. W. Rep., 483, with the further
ruling, that if the voter does not make the oath required,
though he is in fact within the terms of the act as to disability, his vote should not be counted, though no fraud is
intended. The Pennsylvania Ballot Law is weak, in not
requiring oath as to disability; yet it has been held that even
under it, officers of election might, and should, in case of
doubt, examine the voter on oath as to his good faith in
alleging his disability: In re Election Instructions, 2 D. R.
,(Pa.) i. But in another case, in the same state, in re Beaver
Co. Elections, 12 Pa. C. C. R. 227, it. was ruled, that the
voter was the sole judge of his disability. Locality may have
had something to do with this difference of opinion, the latter
decision coming from the vicinity of Senator Quay's home.
It was also held, in the former of these Pennsylvania cases,
that the act only contemplated actual physical disability, such
as blindness, paralysis, infirmity or decrepitude, inability to
read, etc., and did not include drunkenness, or ignorance of
the proper method of marking, due to neglect by the voter to
inform himself on that point. The general practice of election
boards in Pennsylvania, however, is to allow the voter assistance on his mere request.
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently decided,
in accord with the best authority, that the occupation of a
Eminent

rural highway, the fee of which belongs to the

abutting owners, by a telegraph company, for -the
erection of its poles, is an additional burden to the easement
for a highway, for which the owners of the fee are entitled to
-compensation: Eels v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 38 N.
E. Rep. 202; affirming Eels v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Hun.
5 16; S. C., 2o N. Y. Suppl. 6oo. To the same *effect are
Blashfield v. Empire State Telephone & Telegraph Co., 18 N. Y.
Suppl. 250; S. C., 24 N.Y. Suppl. ioo6; 71 Hun. 532;
Clesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Macckenzie, 74 Ind. 36.
Other courts, however, have held a contrary doctrine: Pierce
v. Drew, 136 Mass. 79 ; Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co.,
Domain
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Mo. 258. The most recent case to this effect is Brown v.
Eaton, (Mich.), 59 N. W. Rep. 145, in which the court
declared that it was difficult to see any dictinction between
the use of a highway for electric railway poles and for poles
erected for the use of a telegraph or telephone company; in
wilful ignorance of the manifest distinction that the former is
a use for travel, the latter not. Such arguments are their own
best 'refutation.
88

The District Court for the Northern District of California,
after reviewing the authorities, has wisely concluded, in In re
Storror, 63 Fed. Rep. 564, that telegraph mesEvidence,
Privileged sages, in the hands of a telegraph company, are
Communica.
tions
not privileged communications, so far as the company is concerned, and their production will be compelled by
subpoena duces tecum, in aid of an investigation by a grand
jury of supposed criminal acts of the senders and receivers of
messages, with which the company and its officers are not in
any way concerned.
According to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, a person,
who by his "conduct" falsely represents himself as the agent
of a railroad company, and procures money from
False
Pretences

another on the strength of employment which he

promises him, obtains the money by a "false pretence, statement or token," under Gen. Stat. Ky., c. 29, art. 13, § 2:
Comm. v. Murphy, 27 S. W. Rep. 859.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has. lately given one of
those decisions, based on the technical rules of the old
common law, that are apt to afford more comfort
than discouragement to the criminal classes, by
holding, in State v. Taylor, 16 So. Rep. 19o, that where the

defendant has signed the name of a number of drawers to a
note, and signs an addendum to the note, stating that he is
their authorized agent, he cannot be convicted of forgery, as
an apparent agent cannot be convicted of that crime, though
he has no authority in fact; and the falsehood lies not so much
in the forgery of the instrument, as in the false assumption of
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authority as agent. But the expression of the court that the
defendant was not guilty of making the instrument, and there-,
fore not within the definition of a forger, leads one to suspect
that they confounded the meaning of the word "making," as
used in the definition of forgery,, with its much narrower
meaning as applied to a promissory note. At any rate, the
doctrine needs a legislative reproof.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Ware v. Purdy, 6o N. W.
Rep. 526, holds that a voluntary conveyance to the wife and
children of the grantor is not fraudulent as against
Fraudulent
Conveyances existing creditors, though not recorded, when thegrantor is solvent at the time, and the deed is made by him in
view of possible injury to his business of liquor selling from
prohibitory legislation then pending, provided that enough,
property is retained by him to pay existing debts. Queure, as.
to the effect of such a conveyance as against subsequent credi-tors. The Supreme Court of Indiana maintains the same
o
general doctrine, in Emerson v. OPP, 38 N. E. Rep. 33 . The
latter court, however, also holds, that the mere joinder by the
wife, for the purpose of conveying her inchoate interest, in a
conveyance, fraudulent as against creditors, of real property of'
the husband, through a trustee, to himself and his wife, to
hold by entireties, does not form such a consideration as will
support the conveyance ; and the wife who so joins is affected
by the fraud of the husband, whether she had knowledge of'
it or not: Phillips v. Kennedy, 38 N. E. Rep. 410.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately ruled, in.
JT. G. Mattingly Co. v. Mattingly, 27 S.W. Rep. 985, that -when
one purchases the goodwill and firm name of a.
business, he is entitled to receive letters. and teleUoodwill
grams addressed to that firm name, and to the advantage
resulting from busines transactions proposed in them by thecustomers of the old firm.
The Common Pleas of New York City and County, in
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Beai: er v. Banzer, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 803, has held, that an
Husband and estate by entireties can only be created by a
Wife,
conveyance to husband and wife, and that, thereEntireties
fore, a conveyance to the wife by the husband's
-co-tenant will not create such an estate.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, since
the passage of the married women's acts, enabling a married
woman to contract with third persons as if she
Partnership were sole, a wife may form a partnership
with her
the,
payment
of parthusband, so as to bind her property for
-nership debts to strangers: Louiszrille & N. R. Co. v. Alexander, 27 S. W. Rep. 981.
There is a very decided conflict of opinion on this latter
subject; but the mass of authority, if not the weight, seems to
be against the view of the Kentucky court. That view has
been accepted in Michigan, Vail v. Winterstein, 94 Mich. 230;
.S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 932, and in Vermont, Lane v. Bishop, 65
Vt. 575 ; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 499, but rejected in Arkansas,
Gilkerson-Sloss Co. v. Salinger, 19 S. W. Rep. 747; in New
York, Kaufman v. Schocffel, 37 Hun, 140; Lowenstein v.
.Salinger,17 N. Y. SuppI. 70 ; in South Carolina, Weisiger v.
Wood, 36 S. Car. 424; S. C., 15 S. E. Rep. 597, and in
Washington, Board of Trade of Seattle v. Hayden, 30 Pac.
Rep. 87. In one recent case, in South Carolina, Vannerson v.
Cheatham, 19 S. E. Rep. 614, the court claimed that entering
into a contract of partnership would be a contravention of the
statutory prohibition against becoming liable to answer for the
liability of another; but this is absurd, as the liability of a
firm is that of each of the members individually, not that of
,each for the others. There seems to be no good reason why
a wife should not become partner in a firm, either with her
husband, or with any one else. At any rate, no valid objections have as yet been urged against it.
The right to take and use the ice on streams and ponds
.seems to be a matter that is never settled. It is a most
curious phenomenon, that one of the earliest
decisions on the subject, one that has been
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deservedly hooted at, JYill River lIffg. Co. v. Smith, 34
Conn. 462, should have received two adherents within the
last year, and one of them, apparently, entirely independent in
its origin. In Eidemiller Ice Co. v. Guthrie, 6o N. W. Rep.
717, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled, (i) That the
owner of a mill, who has the right to maintain a pond, or
flow back the water of a stream on the land of another, and'
to use such water to 'operate his mill, possesses, as to the
water, the dominant right, and while not the actual owner of'
the ice which forms on the pond, is entitled to have it remain
there during the time, and whenever, its so remaifiing will be
or is useful and necessary to the legitimate exercise of his
right to use the water as motive power for the mill, or to
successfully operate the mill; but the owner of the land,
if upon a navigable stream, may make any use he desires of
the ice which forms over and above so much of the bed of the
stream to which his ownership extends, as does not interfere
with or injure the rights of the mill owner; (2) That if the
owner of the mill and dam subservient thereto wantonly and
unnecessarily draws water from, or lowers the water in the
pond, and by so doing injures or destroys the ice privileges of
the owner of the land bordering on the pond, he thereby
renders himself liable in damages to the riparian owner; but
the damage is not irreparable, and an injunction will not lie to
restrain him from so drawing off the water. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut, following its former decision, held some
time ago, in Howe v. Andrews, 62 Conn. 398; S. C.,.26 Atl.
Rep. 394, with which the first part of the decision above is in
harmony, that the riparian owner can not cut the ice on
a mill pond, when its removal will cause an injury to the right
of the mill owner. No better comment can be made on this
doctrine than the language of the court in Brookville & Metamora Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134; S. C.; 46 Am.
Rep. 581, and Cummings v. Barrett, IO Cush., (Mass.), 186.
There is an annotation on the general subject of property in
ice, in 32 AM. L. REG. 166.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
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a license tax imposed on "every itinerant who puts up lightning
rods," imposes no burden on interstate commerce,
Interstate
Commerce, as the sale and delivery of the articles are separable
License
from the erection of the same; and the original
packages must of necessity be broken before the articles areput up: State v. Gorham, 20 S. E. Rep. 179.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, also, maintains.
that a statute, which allows the receiver of a telegram to
recover a penalty from the telegraph company for
failure to deliver the telegram as soon as practiPenalty
cable, is not in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of
the constitution: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bright, 20 S. E.
Rep. 146. The telegram in this case was a domestic one, and
therefore within the rule laid down last year by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Postal Telegraph Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; S. C., 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094, which held
that a license tax imposed on such telegrams was valid. But
the Virginia Court went a step further, and, though obiter,
reasserted the doctrine already declared by it in Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Tyler, 18 S. E. Rep. 280, that the penalty
could be recovered for failure to deliver a telegram from
another state, at least in the absence of conflicting legislation
by Congress.
The Supreme Court of California holds, as no one should
have been foolish enough to question, that a judge, who, by
rarriage,.is first cousin, or cousin-german, of a
Judge,
DVsquallfica. stockholder in a corporation, is not thereby distion
qualified to hear a case in whii:h the corporation is
interested: Robinson v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 30 Pac. Rep. 94. If
the contention in the case were sound, it would apply with tenibld force to the case of a judge who is himself a stockholder
in a corporation; and yet these sit almost every day, and no
one questions their qualification. It may and safely be taken
as the general rule, that none but a direct interest in the subject matter is now sufficient to disqualify a judge. See i
AMi. L. REG. AND REV. (N. S.) 817.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has recently decided
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a very interesting point of law, in Brettell v. Deffeback, 6o N.
W. Rep. 167, in which case it held that though,
Judgments
as a general rule, none but parties to a judgment
can have it set aside, a real party in interest, who is the only
one prejudiced by a judgment rendered by default in an action
to which he was not made a party, has a standing in court that
entitles him to move to have that judgment vacated, on the
ground that there was no service of summons sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction of the persons of the nominal defendants,
and that the case was not prosecuted with reasonable diligence.
The facts of this case were peculiar. The 'applicant for
relief purchased the real estate affected by the judgment, of
the parties defendant, in 1882, and took title in 1887, on a certificate of the clerk of the circuit court that no suits were
then pending against them, but this was in fact pending, having
been begun in i88o, thbugh no steps had been taken since that
time. In 1889, judgment was entered against the vendors by
default, which, under the laws of that state, bound the land
in the hands of the purchaser.
In Vallery v. State, 6o N. W. Rep. 347, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska has ruled that it is no defence to a criminal
prosecution for libel that the writing complaindd
Libel
of was a repetition of previous oral publications,
and that the defendant was induced to make the written publication by the acts of the person concerning whom the libel
was published.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Pattersonv. Graham,
30 Atl. Rep. 247, has announced the very reasonable rule,
that when the purchaser of growing trees for the
License
purpose of manufacture enters on the land within
a reasonable time, and cuts all the timber apparently worth
taking, and thereupon removes his mill, and abandons the
premises for eleven years, his right to enter and cut timber is
gone.
According to the Supreme Court of Iowa, a statement in a
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letter to the writer's creditor, in regard to a certain note, that
what
"you know that I will pay what I can, and
Limitation
is right," is not a sufficient admission of liability
to remove the bar of the statute of limitations: Neson v,
Hanson, 6o N. W. Rep. 655.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, in
MacDonald v. U. S., 63 Fed. Rep. 426, has held, that when
the value of bonds in an investment company

depends on their numbering, and the numbering
Lottery
is done by the secretary of the company, according to the
order in which the applications happen to reach him, the
result of the purchase of such bonds is so dependent on
chance, as to render their sale a loftery.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has lately ruled, that when a
person' institutes a criminal prosecution, with full knowledge
of all the material facts, and of their insufficiency
Malicious
Prosecution to support the charge, the facts that the accused
waived a preliminary hearing, that he was indicted, and that
the jury disagreed on the trial, are no defence to an action for
malicious prosecution, though the person who prosecutes did
not appear before the grand jury, nor give false testimony on
the trial: Barber v. Scott, 6o N. W. Rep. 497.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit has
rendered a most interesting and important decision, in Arthur
v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, on appeal from the
Master and
famous order of Judge Jenkins, in Farmers' Loan
Servant
& Trust Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. Co, 16o Fed. Rep. 803, which
called down on that unhappy gentleman's head the woes of
a CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION. Justice Harlan,
in delivering the opinion of the court, reviews the ground very
carefully, and concludes that the court below erred in granting the clause of the injunction,, restraining the employ6s of
the road from "so quitting the service of the said receivers,
with or without notice, as to cripple the property or prevent or
hinder the operation of the said railroad," on the ground that
it would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him
55
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to work for, or to remain in the personal service of another.
One who is placed under such restraint is in a condition of
involuntary servitude. The rule is, without exception, that
equity will not compel the actual affirmative performance by
an employ6 of merely personal services, any more than it
will compel an employer to retain, in his personal service, any
one who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable to him
for service of that character. The right of an employ6,
engaged to perform personal service, to quit that service, rests
upon the same basis as the right of his employer to discharge
him from further personal service. If the quitting, in the one
case, or the discharging, in the other, is in violation of the contract between the parties, the one injured by the breach has
bis action for damages, and a court of equity will not, in-directly or negatively, by means of an injunction restraining
the violation of the contract, compel the affirmative performance from day to day, or the affirmative acceptance, of merely
personal services. Relief of that character has always been
regarded as impracticable. In the case of a railroad, the
injury and inconvenience to the public that may result from
simultaneous cessation of work by any considerable number
of employs should be remedied by legislation.
This, however, studiously ignores the fact that the remedy
by action for damages for breach of contract is wholly inadequate, and that the position of the railroad employ6 is quasipublic, and his services not of a "merely personal" nature.
A public officer may be compelled to perform the duties of
his office by mandamus; and equity can certainly enjoin him
from refusing to perfori those duties. The failure of the
court to pass upon these questions robs the decision of much
of its weight.
But even as it stands, it is by no means the victory for
labor that it has been boasted to be, and as the worthy gentlemen who composed the Strike Commission, in their fatherly
solicitude for the poor workingmen, seem to have understood
it to be, judging from the reference to it in their report. Justice Harlan admits that while individual cessation of work
.cannot be restrained, a combination or conspiracy to procure
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an employ6 or body of employ6s to quit service in .violation of
their contract of service, would be unlawful, and in a proper
case might be enjoined, if the injury threatened would be
irremediable at law; and that, accordingly, the clause of the
injunction granted, restraining the employ~s "from combining and conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the
service of said railroad, with the object and intent of crippling
the property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation
of said railroad," wis good. See i AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.)
6o9.
Mechanics' liens are always a fruitful source of litigation;
.and the reports are usually plentifully seasoned with cases on
Mechanies' that subject. The present month is no exception.
Liens
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Davis & Ran.kin Bldg. & .fMfg. Co. v. Murray, 6o N. W. Rep. 437, has
recently decided, that when a number of subscribers to the
stock of a creamery company contract for the erection of a
building, but the contract of subscription creates only a several
liability, a mechanics' lien cannot be enforced on- the joint
property for the non-payment of the contract price; and the
Supreme Court of Kansas has held, that a lien for materials
furnished for the erection bf improvements on land in one
state, may be maintained when the contract for the materials
was entered into in another: United States nv. Co. v. Phelps
& Bigelow Windmill Co., 37 Pac. Rep. 982.
According to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in the
absence of an express agreement, or anything indicating an
intention to the contrary, a mechanic or materialWaiver
man does not waive his right to file and enforce a
lien, by merely accepting, for the amount of his claim, the
promissory note of the owner, at his instance and request,
and for the sole purpose of suspending his right to foreclose
such lien for sixty days, at which time the note, according to
its terms, matures: Hill v. Alliance Bidge Co., 6o N. W. Rep.
752.
This is in accord with the general rule on the subject, that
the mere taking of collateral security will not amount to
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a waiver of the right to a lien, unless there is an express
understanding to that effect, or it can be implied from the acts
of the parties: Hoagland v. Lusk, (Neb.), 50 N. W. Rep. 162.
Payment is, of course, a bar to a lien, and the acceptance of a.
note as payment, whether it be that of the owner or of a third
person, will be a waiver of the right to file a lien: Smitli v.
Parsons,37 Neb. 677; S. C., 56 N. W. Rep. 326. So, too,
the fact that the creditor discounted the note affords a strong
presumption that he accepted it as payment of the debt, and
will amount to a waiver, where it is not in his possession or
control at the time of suing out the lien: McDziffee v. Rca,
13 Pa. C. C. R. 26x. But the lien is n.ot waived, if the circumstances attendant upon the taking of the note are not
inconsistent with its retention: Kipatrick v. Kansas City &
B. R. R., (Neb.), 57 N. W. Rep. 644; Jones v. 'Moores, 67
Hun. lO9; S. C., 22 N. Y. Suppl. 53; and the fact that, after
the note was negotiated, the creditor redeemed it, and surrendered it, will show an intention to preserve the right to the
lien: Davis v. Parsons, 157 Mass. 584; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep.
S1117. The taking of a note as collateral security merely
suspends the enforcement of the lien until the note is payable :
Keogh Ofg. Co. v. Eisenberg, 27 N. Y. Suppl. 356. But it
has been held in Canada, that when the lien is thus suspended
during the currency of a note, it is absolutely gone: Edmonds
v. Tiernan, 21 Can. S. C. R. 4o6.
The Irish Chancery Division, in Biddulph's Estate, [18941
I I. R. 488, has recently decided, that an agreement by B.

with A., as follows: "In consideration of the
advances this day made by you, I hereby agree
that in case I fail to pay you any promissory note or bill of
exchange of mine when due, I shall, upon demand, execute to
you a mortgage on all my houses and lands, to sedure to you
the payment of all sums of money advanced, or to be advanced,
by you to me, on my promissory notes, or bills of exchange,
with interest, till paid, at such rate as may, in each case, be
provided by such promissory notes or bills of exchange,"
creates, without any demand, a valid equitable mortgage on
Mortgage
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lands, the property of B. at the time of the agreement, for the
amount of notes or bills unpaid at maturity; the words, "on
demand," having reference to the execution of a legal mortgage.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has again asserted the
rule, that the power vested in a municipal corporation by the
unicipal legislature, to make by-laws for its own government and the regulation of its police, includes the
power to punish violations of. its ordinances,
though the offence, (e. g., carrying concealed deadly weapons,)
is also denounced by state law: Board of Police of Opelousas
v. Giron, i6 So. Rep. 19o. See i Am. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.)
669.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Foley v. State, 6o
N. W. Rep. 574, while acknowledging the general rule to be,
"Ordinances,
that the courts will not take judicial notice of
JudicialNotice municipal ordinances unless required so to do by
special charter or general law, very wisely rejected the weight
of authority, and held that an exception to that rule should
be recognized, in favor of courts of municipal corporations,
which will take notice of ordinances of their own municipalities,
since they stand in the same relation to those ordinances as
courts of general jurisdiction to the general laws of the state;
and that, therefore, such ordinances need not be set out in an
information preferred in a municipal court.
This, however, must be understood to apply only to purely
municipal courts of limited jurisdiction, and not to courts of
general jurisdiction, which may happen to b6 located within
the bounds of the municipality.
Corporations,
Ordinances

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, when a telephone company negligently leaves a
Negligence,
wire connecting plaintiff's building with another,
Act of God and a pole on the latter is struck by lightning,
which is conducted along the wire to plaintiff's building, and
sets it on fire, so that it is burned, the company cannot claim
that the lightning was the act of God, as by its negligent act
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it so arranged that the stroke could destroy plaintiff's building: Jackson v. Wis. Tel. Co., 6o N. W. Rep. 430.
Among the many subdivisions of the general subject of
negligence, that of imputed negligence is fast becoming one of
the most prominent. Several decisions on this
imputed
Negligence, point have been published
the past month.
during
Husband and
Wife
The Supreme Court of Indiana has decided, that
the negligence of a husband, driving his wife over a railroad
crossing, where she is injured, cannot be imputed to her, so as
to bar her recovery: Lake Slhore & MZ. S. Ry. CoV. MCcfntosh,
38 N. E. Rep. 476. To the same effect are Louisville, New
Alb. & Chic. Ry. Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139; S. C., 29 N. E_
Rep. 481; Chic., St. L. & Pitts. Ry. Co. v. Spilker, 134 Ind.
380; S. C., 33 N. E. Rep. 28o, rehearing denied, 34 N. E.
Rep. 218. But the negligence of the husband has been
imputed to the wife, who remained seated in the carriage at a.
railroad station, while he held the horse, "because she was in
his care:" Toledo, St. L. & Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Crittenden,.
42 Ill. App. 469.
As if the understanding between the parties
could relieve the railroad company from liability for its own.
negligence !
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently passed
upon two cases on the question of the imputation of the negligence of a parent to a child, and in both cases.
Parent
and Child
held the negative. In Houston City Ry. Co. v.
Rkchart, 27 S. W. Rep. 918, it ruled, that when a father and
minor son, both members of the city fire department, are both
injured by the overturning of a hose cart, driven by the father
caused by the defective construction of a street railway track
at a street crossing, the negligence of the father, if any, cannot
be imputed to the son; and in Allen v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
27 S. W. Rep. 943, that in an action by a child, through its
father as next friend, against a railroad company, for personal
injury, the negligenc6 of the father, in whose care the chilct
was travelling, cannot be imputed to the latter. These arethe more remarkable, as the same court, in Johnson v. Gulf, C.
& S. F. Ry. Co., 21 S. W. Rep. 274, held that the negligence
of the father was to be imputed to a blind son, of age of dis-
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cretion, who was unable tb take care of himself, and, of his
own volition, entrusted his safety to his father. Similarly, the
negligence of the mother is not to be imputed to a child: Tex.
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fletcher, (Tex.), 26 S. W. Rep. 446. See
Murphysboro v. Woolsey, 47 Ill. App. 447; St. L., -. M. & S. Ry.
Co. y. Rezroad, (Ark.), 26 S. W. Rep. 1037.
The negligence of the driver of a vehicle, with whom the
person injured is riding at his invitation, and over whom he
has no control, is not to be imputed to the latter: Al. & V.
Ry. Co. v. Davis, 69 Miss. 444; S. C., f3 So. Rep. 693;
*B. & 0. R. R. v. State, (Md.), 29 Atl. Rep. 5 I8; contra,.
Whittaker v. City of Helena, (Mont.), 35 Pac. Rep. 904. Thenegligence of the driver of a street car is not to be imputed:
to a passenger: Little Rock & Hl. R. Co. v. Zarrel, 58 Ark.454; S. C., 25 S. W. Rep. II 7 . And the negligence of a.
wife, which caused her injury, ,is not imputed to the husband,
so as to bar his recovery' for those causes of injury peculiar to,
himself, such as the loss of her society and aid in household
affairs, and medical expenses: Honey v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co.,.
59 Fed. Rep. 423. But the negligence of a nurse, in chargeof a child, will be imputed to its parents, so as to bar a,
recovery by them for its death: Schlenks v. CentralPass. Ry.
Co., (Ky.), 23 S. W. Rep. 589. And the negligence' of a.
gripman, under the control of the conductor of a car, will be
imputed to the latter, so as to bar his recovery from a third
person, whose acts contributed to the injury: Minster v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 53 Mo. App. 276.
There is a full annotation on this siibjept in 32 Am. L_
REG. 763.
In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York,.
when an instrument is in all other respects a negotiable promissory note of a corporation, the fact that a seal isaffixed thereto, purporting to be the seal of the
corporation, but unaccompanied by any recital or act showing
that the officers of the corporation intended, or. in fact, did
affix it, does not destroy its negotiability: Wceks v. Esler, 38
N. E. Rep. 377.
Negotiable
Instrument
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The Chancery Division, in Lambton v. M17fellish, [8941 3 Ch.
163, has lately applied the principle that the acts of two or
more persons may, taken together, constitute such
"Nuisance
a nuisance that the court will restrain
all from
doing the acts constituting the nuisance, although the annoyance occasioned by the act of any one of them, if taken
alone, would not be a nuisance, to the case of two proprietors
of merry-go-rounds, who used organs as an accompaniment
to their amusement; and enjoined them both.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has reasserted the somewhat
,harsh doctrine, that a parent is liable for-necessaries furnished
Parent and to a minor son, while living away from home with
child,
her consent, though the son was able to work,
Necessaries

and controlled his own earnings: Cooperv. Mac-

Namara, 6o N. W. Rep.

522.

The same court has also held, that it is within the scope of
the partnership business to borrow money to pay the firm
debts: BueMner v. Steinbrecher,6o N. W. Rep. 177;
Partnership and that one who loans money
to a member of a
mercantile firm, and receives from him a note, executed in the
name of the firm, has a right to presume that the note was
rnade in the course of the partnership business: Platt v
Koehler, 6o N. W. Rep. 178.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, while admitting that it
seems to be the better opinion that the plaintiff, in an action
for personal injuries, may be compelled to submit
Practice,
Civil,
to a personal examination, is of opinion that a
Personal

Examination

judge of the district court has no jurisdiction, at

chambers, outside of the county in which the cause i pending,
to make an order requiring the plaintiff to submit his body to
such an examination by a board of physicians, appointed by
the judge for that purpose: Ellsworth v. Fairbtry,6o N. W.
Rep. 336. There is an excellent annotation on the right to
enforce personal examination, in 32 Am. L. REG. 550.
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The same court holds, that on a trial by the court without
- jury, it is not reversible error to deny the party holding
Right to Open the affirmative of the issue the right to open and

and Close
close the argument, when it is not apparent from
the record that he has been prejudiced thereby: Citizens' State
Bank v. Baird, 6o N. W. Rep. 55 1.
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, an affidavit by
the defendant in a criminal case for a continuance on account
of the absence of witnesses, should allege that
Practice,
Criminal
they are absent without the cons~nt of the defendint, either directly or indirectly given: Biyant v. State, 16 So.

Rep. 177.

It has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in State v. Evans, 6o N. W. Rep. 433, that
Prohibition

prohibition will not lie to restrain a magistrate
from proceeding in a criminal cause, because the

warrant was void, since the legal remedy is adequate, nor on
the ground that the accused has been once in jeopardy. It is
not the province of the writ of prohibition to supply the place
of a writ of error.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately ruled, that
-when a railroad company allows two passenger cars to remain
on a side track, near the depot and along a public
Railroads,
Negligence
9treet, the doors being open, it is negligence to
back other cars against them for the purpose of coupling,
without seeking to ascertain whether there are any persons in
such cars, though no one had a right to be therein; and if
the company neglects its duty in this respect, it will be liable
to a boy injured thereby: Loidsville & N. Ry. Co. v. Popp, 27
S. W. Rep. 992. And the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
holds, that a railroad company is liable for injury to mind and
body caused by nervous shock and fright, due to
Mental
suffering
the negligent running of cars off a switch into
plaintiff's yard, and within a few feet of her house, though
the plaintiff was not actually touched: Yoakumn v. Kroeger,
27 S. W. Rep. 953.
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The feud between the abstractor of titles and the county
officials still continues, and the courts are from time to time
obliged to define the limitations of their respective
Records,
Inspection
rights de novo. In the latest case on this subject,
Burton v. Reynolds, 6o N. W. Rep. 452, the Supreme Court
of Michigan decided that no, person bas a right to keep a
clerk continuously in the office of the county clerk, with free
access to the files, for the purpose of making abstracts therefrom, except under such reasonable regulations as the county
clerk may prescribe, and that the payment of a fee to provide
additional office facilities was such a reasonable regulation.
The same court recently, in Day v. Button, 96 Mich. 6oo;
S. C., 56 N. W. Rep. 3, ruled that an abstractor of titles could
not use the office of a coufity officer to the exclusion of
others, or annoy him by the presence of a large working
force, or by work at unseasonable hours. See West Jersey
Title & Guarantee Co. v. Barber, 49 N. J. Eq. 474, and an
annotation on that case, in 31 AM. L. REG. 769.
The Supreme Court of Oregon recently held, in Philonath
College v. Wyatt, 37 Pac. Rep. 1022, that the action of the
highest ecclesiastical body of a religious sect, in
Religious
Societies
adopting the report of a committee appointed to
determine the validity of a constitutional amendment, and to
submit it to the vote of its members, the amendment being
adopted by the adoption of the report, is legislative, and therefore not binding as an adjudication upon the civil courts; and
the Supreme Court of Nebraska has decided, in Peterson v.
Samueson, 6o N. W. Rep. 347, that when certain members
of a church society had withdrawn therefrom and organized
another society of the same church, and then returned to the
society from which they had withdrawn, there is n.o presumption that by so withdrawing the seceders forfeited their membership in the church, as parts of which both societies existed,
and on reunion the same society existed as had been originally
"organized.
According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, an action for
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slander in regard to a business cannot be maintained by the.
Slander

husband of the owner thereof, though, in addition

to his salary, he is entitled to a proportion of the
profits, when he has no interest in the corpus of the business:
Child v. Emerson, 6o N. W. Rep. 292. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana is of opinion that an apothecary is not liable in
damages to a physician, merely and only because he has on
one or two occasions declined to fill his prescriptions, for
reasons not at all impugning the physician's capacity; but that
he is liable, if, without the slightest cause,' he indulges in
public expressions tending to create the impression of thephysician's incompetency; as, for instance, that his diplomk is.
not worth a straw: Tarlton v. Lagarde, 16 So. Rep. 18o..
The same court has also very sensibly held, that when persons
mutually engage in bandying opprobrious epithets, an action
of slander for words thus uttered is not to be encouraged;
and the interchange of such epithets, and mutual vituperation
and abuse, will justify a judge in approving a verdict for the
defendant, though the slanderous words are provqd: Gold-.
berg v. Dobberon, 16 So. Rep. 192.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Stephenson v. Boody, 38
N. E. Rep. 331, has recently decided, that when the SupremeStare Declsis
Court overrules its former decisions, construinga statute, and gives it a new construction, contracts affected by that statute, and made while the former
construction obtained, will be given the same effect, after thechange in construction, as if no such chartge had been made.
The Supreme Court of Michigan holds, that when themaker of a note executes a chattel mortgage to a trustee to
Subrogation indemnify an indorser against liability thereon, a
subsequent mortgagee is not entitled, on tender.tothe trustee of the amount due on the mortgage, to be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the note, as against the
indorser: Schmittdiel v. Moore, 6o N. W. Rep. 279.
In a recent case in the Appellate Court of Indiana, it was-
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..ruled, that when a surety pays a judgment obtained against
him and two co-sureties, one of whom is insolvent,
he may recover in equity from the solvent surety
one-half of the amount so paid: Newton v. Pence, 38 N. E.
Rep. 484. The same doctrine prevails in courts of law, wherever the distinctions between actions at law and in equity have
been abolished, or equity powers have been conferred on common law courts: Michael v. Allbright, 126 Ind. 172; S. C., 25
N. E. Rep. 902; Faurot v. Gates, 86 Wis. 569; S. C., 57 N.W.
Rep. 294. But the share of the insolvent surety cannot be
,recovered from the others, when all the sureties have agreed
.among themselves to raise a common -fund to pay the debt,
some contributing more than their adequate share, and others
less, but the former agree to release the latter from any further
liability: Cummings v. May, 91 Ala. 233.
Suretles,

•Contribution

The .Chancery Division has lately held, that when a testator
,gives all his property to trustees, upon certain trusts, and
directs that certain speGified sums of money should
be invested for the benefit of his four sons on their
attaining the age of twenty-one years, such sums to be applied
:as the trustees in their discretion may think fit; and further
directs that the sums specified should be very judiciously
invested, as they were intended specially for the advancement
.in life of the respective recipients ; the sons are nevertheless
-absolutely entitled to the legacies, on attaining the specified
age, freed from the exercise of any discretion on the part of
'the trustees: In rejohnston, [1894] 3 Ch. 204.
The same court, in Noyes v. Paterson, [1894] 3 Ch. 267,
-has ruled, that a person who has contracted to purchase land
is not entitled to repudiate his Contract, merely
because one link in the vendor's title consists of a
voluntary conveyance to a person under whom the vendor
-claims by purchase for value.
Vendor and
Vendee

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

Missouri, a verdict cannot be impeached, solely on the affidavit
of a juror that the time of imprisonment was
Verdict
fixed by -each juror writing on a piece of paper
the number of years he was in favor of, and then dividing the.
sum by I2: State v. Woods, 27 S. W. Rep. I 14. It is high,
time that the courts abandoned this useless technicality, and
permitted the evidence of such gross violation of duty, from
whatever source, to have its proper weight; and not to cling
to an absurd presumption in favor of the sanctity of a verdict,
that is as unreasonable and as ill-founded as .the maxim that
",the king can do no wrong."
The Supreme Court of Iowa has just decided a very interesting and novel case, in which it held that no one of several
Waters
persons, whose wells tap the same subterranean
stream, can make an artificial use of the water
therefrom, so as to entirely deprive the others at any time of
the ability to make such use of it; that the use of water
taken from such a well for city purposes is an artificial use, as
is also its use by an individual for a bath-house; and that,
therefore, the city cannot deprive the owner of the bathhouse of the use of the water, without paying damages therefor: Willis v. City of Perry, 6o N. W. Rep. 727. It is also
actionable to divert water from a stream, either surface or subterranean, by dams, wells or pumps, by which the flow of
water is diminished, though such diversion is by the owner of
land through which the stream flows or percolates, and on his
own premises: McClellan v. Hurdle, 3 Colo. App. 430. But
one is not prevented from lawful digging bn his own land,
though he thereby drains a spring on the land of another:
Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82. This, however, seems
questionable, and is a stretching of the damnum absque ijzjuria
doctrine to the very last point of tension. The distinction, if
there be any, which seems doubtful, lies in the fact that in the
actionable cases the act of the owner of the land is intended
to interfere with the water, while in the non-actionable cases
that interference is only an incidental consequence of an otherwise lawful act.
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The Supreme Court of Missouri has recently laid down a
very salutary rule, in State v. Gesell, 27 S. W. Rep. IioI, to
the effect that when, after an order excluding
Witnesses,
Separation
all witnesses from the court-room, defendant's
witness, a co-defendant to whom a severance has been
granted, remains seated by him during the trial, the court
is justified in refusing to allow him to be examined, on the
.ground that the defendant connived at his disobedience.

